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‘9/11 was an inside job’: Full Speech by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at UN

Iran’s president sparked a mass walk-out by US delegates yesterday after telling a UN summit that most people believe the American government was behind the 9/11 attacks.

By Nerti U. Qatja@VOP_Today

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is an Iranian politician who was the sixth President of Iran from 2005 to 2013. He was also the main political leader of the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran, a coalition of conservative political groups in the country.

Delegates from the US and European countries walked out of the UN’s General Assembly hall during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech when the Iranian president claimed “most nations” believed the US government was behind the September 11 attacks.

In his speech to the UN, Ahmadinejad said there was a theory “that some segments within the US government orchestrated the attack to reverse the declining American economy, and its grips on the Middle East, in order to save the Zionist regime.”

Ahmadinejad then said: “The majority of the American people as well as most nations and politicians around the world agree with this view,” during which point the US delegation rose from their seats and left, along with a number of other countries’ delegations.

In response the US delegation issued a statement:

Rather than representing the aspirations and goodwill of the Iranian people, Mr Ahmadinejad has yet again chosen to spout vile conspiracy theories and anti-Semitic slurs that are as abhorrent and delusional as they are predictable.”

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Russia Arms Iran As Kerry Refuses To Use U.N. Veto

Tehran is spending billions under the Iran nuclear deal to buy arms, including advanced Russian fighters. The U.S. has a weapon — our U.N. veto — but Secretary of State John Kerry won’t use it.

By, (Investor’s Business Daily) – Iran Rising


When the United Nations endorsed President Obama’s Iran nuclear pact last year, it refuted the charge that Tehran would use the tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief to dominate the Mideast militarily by requiring U.N. Security Council approval for some conventional arms sales to Iran. And like everything the Security Council does, the U.S. enjoys veto power over such approval.

But what use is a veto if we won’t use it?

Russia's advanced Su-30 multi-purpose warplane is just part of a multi-billion-dollar conventional arms shopping spree President Obama's Iran nuclear deal has set in motion, with dire consequences. (Savitsky Vadim/ZUMA Press/Newscom)

Russia’s advanced Su-30 multi-purpose warplane is just part of a multi-billion-dollar conventional arms shopping spree President Obama’s Iran nuclear deal has set in motion, with dire consequences. (Savitsky Vadim/ZUMA Press/Newscom)

 

During testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Thursday, Secretary of State John Kerry was asked the following by House Democrat Brad Sherman of California: “Under the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, Russia can’t sell fighter planes to Iran unless the Security Council specifically approves that. I’ll ask you, will we use our veto to prevent fighter planes from being sold to Iran from Russia?”

Kerry’s answer was a continuation of the appeasement of the world’s foremost terrorist state that is a hallmark of the Obama administration.

“Well, I don’t think you have to use a veto,” Kerry answered, adding that “there’s a committee” it will go through. When Sherman pressed, “And would we use our veto if necessary to prevent the sale?” Kerry responded, “I haven’t looked at the specifics of the transaction,” but “in principle, we are very concerned about the transfer of weapons” and “would approach it with great skepticism … (if) the committee signs off on it, I assure you. We’ll stay in touch with you.”

The fighters in question are fourth-generation Su-30SM warplanes, which are highly-maneuverable multi-role fighters, “capable of air-to-air and air-to-ground strikes and can be equipped with a wide variety of precision munitions.” As the IsraelMatzav blog points out, after news of the proposed sale first broke earlier this month, the Obama administration first “flat out denied that it had the ability to block weapons sales,” then “wasn’t sure if the U.S. could veto,” then finally “acknowledged the sale is illegal and falls under” Security Council Resolution 2231.

It comes on the heels of Moscow selling the long-range S-300 air defense system to Tehran. Both the advanced fighter and the sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, which can destroy both manned bombers and cruise missiles, will make it much more difficult for the U.S. and Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear manufacturing facilities, should they choose to do so.

Iran will also likely be getting Russia’s most advanced T-90 tanks in its multibillion-dollar“Putin-Mart” shopping spree, just the latest in its long-standing alliance with the former Soviet Union, a partnership based on the two powers’ anti-American interests.

The Washington Times’ Jed Babbin last week noted that “Russia has been building Iran’s nuclear power plants for about two decades,” and Russian ruler Vladimir Putin “has been working to reduce Western sanctions on Iran and lessen pressures on its nuclear weapons program for at least a decade.” And Babbin warned that Putin could secretly sell Iran its Nudol anti-satellite missile “or the technology behind it” and “could be helping Iran develop its cyberwar capabilities with our satellites in mind. And that’s only a couple of the many weapon systems and technologies that Russia could, and likely will, sell to Iran in secret.”

Far from reining in Islamofascist Iran, what Obama and Kerry’s nuclear deal is doing is massively arming Iran with conventional weapons, as it lets it keep the ability to construct nuclear arms tomorrow — by which time it may already militarily dominate the Middle East.

WW3 ALERT: Will Iran Continue Its Nuclear Program Abroad ?

Debate surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) tends to focus on the deal itself, its strengths, weaknesses and the prospects for successful implementation. Experts have discussed whether the deal—even if upheld—means that Iran will be prevented from developing a nuclear weapon forever, or whether it merely delays Iran on its path to a workable nuclear capability. While the P5+1 insist the deal stops Iran forever, serious doubts have been raised regarding the political will of these powers to hold Iran to its commitments, especially given their apparent hesitation to arouse Iran’s ire, thus endangering the deal.

But one issue has been sorely missing from the discussion: the prospect that Iran might continue important work on a nuclear weapons capability beyond the bounds of the agreement, and even beyond the borders of Iran itself. Indeed, there is a strong possibility that Iran will continue to benefit from North Korea’s nuclear advances, and some of Iran’s nuclear activities might take place in North Korea itself, using the hermit state as a convenient backyard.

For Iran to do so would make perfect strategic sense. Iran has a clear interest in latching onto North Korea’s program—Pyongyang both has technology that Tehran wants and seems to care only about being paid, as demonstrated by the nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Syria. There is already evidence of Iranian-North Korean cooperation in the ballistic missile field, cooperation with implications that extend to the nuclear realm as well.

 

There’s a history. The security relations between Iran and North Korea began during the Iran-Iraq war, and since that time, their missile and, later, nuclear cooperation has continued and expanded. In September 2012, for example, Iran and North Korea signed an agreement for technological and scientific cooperation. A few years ago, they also established the “anti-hegemonic front.” The extensive cooperation between the two states has, over the years, included mutual visits by top North Korean and Iranian nuclear and missile scientists, including to Syria as well. The official delegations, and exchanges of scientists, demonstrate the wide range of relations between the two states. Missile technologies developed by North Korea were assimilated in Iranian Shahab missiles, and a failed missile test in Syria in 2007 caused the death of Syrian, Iranian and North Korean experts.

It is difficult to know the precise extent of cooperation between Tehran and Pyongyang in the nuclear realm, partly due to difficulties in the intelligence field—namely, collecting hard evidence from the two countries—and partly due to the lack of incentive on the part of the U.S. intelligence agencies to share findings that might cause difficulties in the P5+1 framework. Still, it is known that Iranians were present at some of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, and that North Korea built the reactor in Syria that was bombed in 2007, which it is safe to assume that Iran at least had knowledge of, if not more direct involvement. The Syrian-North Korean nuclear cooperation demonstrates Pyongyang’s willingness to sell its nuclear know-how and hardware to the highest bidder. One could imagine that Pyongyang would be willing to share with Iran its experience from four nuclear tests, for the right price. After all, North Korea is in dire need of financial assistance due to economic setbacks and strained relations with Beijing.

What does each state gain from the bilateral cooperation? Iran gets nonconventional technologies and the expertise that it needs, while North Korea benefits economically by selling its know-how. Moreover, for Iran this opens a backdoor channel, conveniently beyond the bounds of inspections and scrutiny, and the JCPOA itself. So Iran can make necessary advances in North Korea, while ostensibly adhering to the agreement with the P5+1.

There is certainly enough in each country’s recent history for this to be an ongoing topic of investigation, so why is so little attention paid to this danger? Why are the critics of the JCPOA not talking about this concern?

We don’t have the answer, but North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, carried out in early January, and its more recent satellite launch have given a boost to those that are asking questions, and some in Congress have recently demanded that the Obama administration reveal to Congress what it knows about the two countries’ nuclear cooperation. But when the P5+1 feel perfectly comfortable closing the file on Iran’s past weaponization work, despite the damning IAEA report released in early December 2015, they do not inspire trust—not as far as getting to the bottom of Iran’s nuclear weapons work is concerned.

This issue cannot be ignored, as it could prove crucial in Iran’s ongoing drive to maintain a nuclear breakout capability. Beyond the evidence of cooperation between the two countries that has already accumulated, these bilateral ties should be watched very closely for the simple reason that it makes perfect strategic and economic sense for the two to continue what is obviously highly beneficial mutual collaboration.

Iran No Longer Accepting Dollars For Oil

death-of-the-petrodollar

Even with a number of U.S. sanctions against Iran coming to an end, the Iranian government has recently made a very important decision in regards to its oil payment system and it could spell bad news for the United States. This is because Iran has apparently decided to no longer accept U.S. dollars for payment on both its new and outstanding oil sales. Instead it will receive its payment in euros.

Reuters has cited an official from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) as stating that the new plan will apply to “newly signed deals” with France’s Total, Russia’s Lukoil, and Spain’s Cepsa.

Reuters quotes the official as saying that “In our invoices we mention a clause that buyers of our oil will have to pay in euros, considering the exchange rate versus the dollar around the time of delivery.”

In addition, Iran is also informing its trading partners, including India, that owe billions of dollars that it now prefers to be paid in euros instead of dollars.

By Brandon Turbeville


Read More: Iran No Longer Accepting Dollars For Oil; Demanding Euros Instead